Dear Rod,

I am responding to your letter of 23 April 2010 in which you refer to the 8 April route hijacking event as reported on bgpmon. You say in your letter that you were “concerned that events such as these decrease the trust that the Internet community has in the addressing system”. Further, you ask what ICANN should do to deal with situations like this route hijacking event.

We would like to point out that, as you are certainly aware, this event is a failure of the routing system, not of the addressing system. In any statement this distinction and the underlying network realities should be made very clear.

The RIRs, working together as the NRO, have moved ahead by developing the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) system, in accordance with the relevant standards. By doing so we have demonstrated our own appreciation of this issue, well ahead of others, and we will be ready to launch the fully operational system by the beginning of 2011.

However, as we have consistently stated, the RIRs have little influence over the day-to-day practices in Internet routing, which is squarely in the domain of the network operators and outside the mandate of the RIRs. By developing the RPKI system, we recognize our responsibility as registries to provide the basic infrastructure on which applications like secure routing might be relying. However, there are limits to what else we can do, in a concrete sense, because the next steps are in the hands of the IETF, vendors, and operators.

We appreciate your question, and would like to say that the NRO is certainly willing to work closely together with ICANN on aspects of education and public relations regarding this issue.

Further we would like to suggest that for any questions or concerns regarding the RPKI standards or matters of implementation of secure routing, you contact the IETF and relevant operators’ groups, respectively.

With kind regards,

Axel Pawlik
Chair
Number Resource Organization