[CRISP-TEAM] IPR update and request for feedback: 29th Dec

Mon Jan 4 16:31:08 CET 2016

Same with me, I am available for the call as well tomorrow at 1300 UTC.

Thanks,
-Michael

-- 
Michael R. Abejuela
Associate General Counsel
ARIN
3635 Concorde Parkway
Suite 200
Chantilly, VA 20151
(703) 227-9875 (p)
(703) 263-0111 (f)
mabejuela at arin.net

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On 1/4/16, 10:24 AM, "Andrei Robachevsky" <robachevsky at isoc.org> wrote:

>German Valdez wrote on 04/01/16 16:02:
>> Hi
>> 
>> Before all, happy new 2016 for all of you ! :)
>> 
>> In case Izumi decides to move ahead with the call this is the webex
>>details 
>>
>
>FWIW, I can make it
>
>Andrei
>
>> Regards
>> 
>> German
>> 
>> 
>> CRISP January 2016
>> Tuesday, January 5, 2016
>> 1:00 pm  |  UTC |  1 hr
>>  
>> Join WebEx meeting
>> 
>>https://ripencc.webex.com/ripencc/j.php?MTID=m47ae35d7b1cd76bdf6d470ed1a1
>>092f6
>> Meeting number:	706 556 087
>> Meeting password:	crisp
>>  
>> Join by phone
>> 0800-051-3810 Call-in toll-free number (UK)
>> +44-203-478-5289 Call-in toll number (UK)
>> Access code: 706 556 087
>> Global call-in numbers  |  Toll-free calling restrictions
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>>> On 3 Jan 2016, at 12:34 AM, Izumi_Okutani <izumiokutani at yahoo.co.jp>
>>>wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi John and all,
>>>
>>>
>>> Happy New Year to everyone in the CRISP Team!
>>>
>>> Thank you John for explicitly expressing your availability, and
>>>support on having a CRISP call on 5th Jan. This is helpful to know. The
>>>regular time of UTC 1300 was indeed what I meant (2200 was in JST).
>>>
>>> I suspect many of you may still be on holidays, and I continue to
>>>welcome  feedback on whether you support and can join the CRISP call on
>>>IPR on 5th Jan. 
>>>
>>> We organize the call if we can confirm three more members can join the
>>>call.
>>>
>>> It would also be good to know if there are members who cannot join the
>>>suggested call. 
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks,
>>> Izumi
>>>
>>>
>>> Sent from iPhone
>>>
>>> 2016/01/01 3:06、Sweeting, John <john.sweeting at twcable.com> のメッセージ:
>>>
>>>> Hi Izumi,
>>>>
>>>> If you meant 1300 UTC then I can definitely make a call on Jan 5th.
>>>>
>>>> I have read through your work below and fully support it.
>>>>
>>>> Happy 2016
>>>>
>>>> -john
>>>>
>>>> On 12/31/15, 3:01 AM, "crisp-bounces at nro.net on behalf of Izumi
>>>>Okutani"
>>>> <crisp-bounces at nro.net on behalf of izumi at nic.ad.jp> wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> Hello Paul and all,
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> It would be great to hear your feedback and I can wait until 4th Jan.
>>>>>
>>>>> To share a little more background -
>>>>> We are currently coordinating to have a call among the operational
>>>>> community leaders on the week of 4th Jan (7th Jan is a strong
>>>>>candidate).
>>>>>
>>>>> I would like to target to fix the feedback from the CRISP Team
>>>>>before the
>>>>> next call among the three operational communities, and share it
>>>>>online
>>>>> before the call, to start discussions among the OC leaders.
>>>>> That was the thinking behind the suggested date and I agree it would
>>>>>be
>>>>> good to have proper feedback from the CRISP Team members before we
>>>>>share
>>>>> our comment with other OCs, as you suggested.
>>>>>
>>>>> It may also be worth considering an irregular CRISP call before this
>>>>>IPR
>>>>> call among the three OCs, say on 5th Jan at the regular time, after
>>>>>we
>>>>> receive feedback from the CRISP Team members.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> To CRISP Team,
>>>>> To explore this option, I would like to see how many CRISP Team
>>>>>members
>>>>> can join a call, if we organise it on 5th Jan UTC2200, to discuss IPR
>>>>> issue, in preparation for the call with other OC leaders.
>>>>> If you can join and think having a call to discuss it helps, please
>>>>> express it on this list by 4th Jan.
>>>>>
>>>>> If there are less than 5 members who supports the idea and can join
>>>>> (including myself), I suggest we do this online without organising an
>>>>> irregular CRISP call on 5th Jan.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> ...and wish you call a wondeful 2016 to come!
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Izumi
>>>>> PS: Sorry I'm a little slower in my responses as I'm in a remote
>>>>>area in
>>>>> Japan now. I still read CRISP and ianaxfer mails and will be back to
>>>>> routine from 4th.
>>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>>> On 2015/12/30 4:21, Paul Rendek wrote:
>>>>>> Hello Izumi,
>>>>>>
>>>>>> I would like provide some feedback to this mail but I ws wondering
>>>>>>if I
>>>>>> could request a bit more time. I can provide a reply to this by 4
>>>>>> January and I hope that is still okay.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Given that we are in the holiday period and New Years is around the
>>>>>> corner I wonder if many would have seen this mail and I would also
>>>>>>be
>>>>>> interested in the thoughts of our colleagues, if they have any.
>>>>>>
>>>>>> Cheers,
>>>>>> Paul
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>>> On 24/12/15 17:22, Izumi Okutani wrote:
>>>>>>> Dear CRISP Team,
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I hope you are enjoying holidays if you celebrate Christmas.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> As I have updated at the last CRISP call, the target timeline we
>>>>>>>have
>>>>>>> suggested is in two stages.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Stage one (agree on principles and framework): before the ICG &
>>>>>>>CCWG
>>>>>>> proposals submission to the NTIA (around Feb 2016)
>>>>>>> Stage two (complete implementation on IPR) : before the IANA
>>>>>>>contract
>>>>>>> expiry (Sep 2016)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> For discussions on stage stage, I would like to share draft of
>>>>>>> comparison I have made between the CRISP IPR principles, and the
>>>>>>> principles developed in DT-IPR in CWG, Chaired by Greg Shatan.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> DT-IPR: DRAFT OF POTENTIAL PRINCIPLES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR OWNER OF
>>>>>>> IANA TRADEMARKS AND DOMAIN NAMES
>>>>>>> Google doc:
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>https://docs.google.com/document/d/1ZGSlKj-JSXe4T0wWv-hN6srDVOwhRJvQ
>>>>>>>ZzRp
>>>>>>> kGAAPk8/edit?pref=2&pli=1
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I welcome your feed back until 29th Dec on:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 1) Whether you agree with the categorization as a)-e)
>>>>>>> 2) Whether each principle is adequately categorised under a)-e)
>>>>>>>   Especially under a) and b): if you have any objection, please
>>>>>>> raise it
>>>>>>> 3) Do you agree with an observation that if I.1.a. is set as the
>>>>>>> minimum requirement, it would cause inconsistency with the CRISP
>>>>>>>IPR
>>>>>>> principles (would set a stronger minimum requirement)
>>>>>>>   - I. 1. The Owner must be ³neutral.²a. Structural neutrality: the
>>>>>>> Owner may not have any structural tie to any operational community
>>>>>>>to
>>>>>>> the exclusion of any other. (That is, if there is a structural tie
>>>>>>>to
>>>>>>> any operational community, there must be an equivalent tie to each
>>>>>>>of
>>>>>>> the other operational communities. Alternatively, the Owner could
>>>>>>>have
>>>>>>> no structural ties to any operational community.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> After reflecting your feedback, I would then like to share it with
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> other operational community leaders on 30th Dec.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>> Suggested way forward on how we coordinate:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I have categorised the principles developed in CWG DT-IPR as below.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> a) High level principles consistent with the CRISP IPR principles
>>>>>>> b) High level principles which was not discussed in the CRISP but
>>>>>>>no
>>>>>>> concerns observed
>>>>>>> c) High level principles which would/may not be consistent with the
>>>>>>> CRISP IPR principles
>>>>>>> d) Details which are to be further discussed and to be coordinated
>>>>>>>  - Details relevant for framework
>>>>>>>  - Details relevant for implementation
>>>>>>> e) Intention to be confirmed by other party
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Rather than trying to reach an agreement and coordinate everything
>>>>>>>at
>>>>>>> once, my suggestion is to target to fix the high level principles
>>>>>>> categorised as a) and b), coordinate online on c) as a start.
>>>>>>> Then, we can coordinate to agree on framework. Some parallel work
>>>>>>>can
>>>>>>> be accommodated as needed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Comparison of of the principles
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *a) Principles consistent with the CRISP IPR principles*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I. Principles and Requirements for the Post-Transition Owner of
>>>>>>>both
>>>>>>> the IANA Trademarks and Domain Names
>>>>>>> 1. The Owner must be ³neutral.²
>>>>>>> a. Structural neutrality: the Owner may not have any structural
>>>>>>>tie to
>>>>>>> any operational community to the exclusion of any other. (That is,
>>>>>>>if
>>>>>>> there is a structural tie to any operational community, there must
>>>>>>>be
>>>>>>> an equivalent tie to each of the other operational communities.
>>>>>>> Alternatively, the Owner could have no structural ties to any
>>>>>>> operational community.); OR
>>>>>>> b. Functional neutrality: the Owner must operate such that
>>>>>>>effective
>>>>>>> control over its actions with respect to the IANA IPR is not
>>>>>>>dominated
>>>>>>> or steered by any of the operational communities to the exclusion
>>>>>>>of
>>>>>>> any other. (That is, each community must have approximately the
>>>>>>>same
>>>>>>> functional relationship to the Owner.)
>>>>>>> c. In either case, neutrality also implies that the IFO cannot be
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> owner of the IANA trademarks and domain names.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note: For I.1.a., I observe consistency with the CRISP IPR
>>>>>>>principles,
>>>>>>> *if* this is the principle to be applied in case we agree to set
>>>>>>>up a
>>>>>>> new Trust. I observe possible inconsistency with the CRISP IPR
>>>>>>> principles if this is set as the minimum requirement (I also
>>>>>>> categorised I.1.a. under "c) Principles which would/may not be
>>>>>>> consistent with the CRISP IPR principles" for this reason, in case
>>>>>>>of
>>>>>>> based on the latter assumption)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. The Owner will take the form of a Trust, either:
>>>>>>> a. A newly formed Trust; OR
>>>>>>> b. The IETF Trust.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 5. The Owner must be responsive, responsible and accountable to the
>>>>>>> three communities.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 7. Owner must be prepared to facilitate separation if requested by
>>>>>>>any
>>>>>>> operational community (see Section II below for details).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> II. Principles and requirements of the Owner in the event of
>>>>>>>separation
>>>>>>> 1. Owner must not create risk to continued operations, stability
>>>>>>>and
>>>>>>> security of the IANA functions in the event of separation.
>>>>>>> 2. Owner must follow the directions of the community or communities
>>>>>>> initiating separation to the extent those instructions are
>>>>>>>compatible
>>>>>>> with the Owner¹s responsibilities and obligations.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IV. Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to iana.org
>>>>>>> 1. The ongoing stability of iana.org is of paramount importance
>>>>>>> (because of its direct operational relevance).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> V.Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to IANA trademarks.
>>>>>>> 3. The Owner must have experience in owning and managing
>>>>>>>trademarks,
>>>>>>> but also experience with issues relating to the Internet.
>>>>>>>Employees or
>>>>>>> advisors may provide such experience.
>>>>>>> a. The Owner must have access to employee(s) with experience and to
>>>>>>> outside trademark counsel.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *b) Principles which was not discussed in the CRISP but no concerns
>>>>>>> observed (to be further reviewed by the CRISP Team and the RIRs)*
>>>>>>> III.
>>>>>>> 1. The names community (and the other operational communities)
>>>>>>>should
>>>>>>> have a process or mechanism to resolve any disputes with the Owner.
>>>>>>> a. i. These should be simple.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. There should also be a process or mechanism to resolve any
>>>>>>>disputes
>>>>>>> between the operational communities relating to the IANA IPR.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 3. Potential Remedies
>>>>>>> a. Moving the IANA IPR to a new Owner (³Divestiture²) is a
>>>>>>>potential
>>>>>>> ultimate remedy
>>>>>>> i. This should not be an option in disputes among the operational
>>>>>>> communities, only in disputes between the Owner and the operational
>>>>>>> communities.
>>>>>>> ii. This is intended to be a stable, long-term relationship. There
>>>>>>> should be a high bar to divesting the IPR from the Owner.
>>>>>>> iii. Any new Owner of the IANA IPR should be approved by all three
>>>>>>> operational communities, or at least subject to a veto under
>>>>>>>certain
>>>>>>> circumstances.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IV. Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to iana.org
>>>>>>> 2. The registration must be held by (in DNS registry terms, the
>>>>>>> registrant must be) the Owner. (This is what it means to ³own² a
>>>>>>>domain
>>>>>>> name, since they are in fact only registrations.)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 7. Until changes contemplated below are agreed, the operation of
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> iana.org domain must remain functionally stable.
>>>>>>> a. ³Functionally stable² means to provide the same features and
>>>>>>>URIs
>>>>>>> as are available from the iana.org site as of the transition.
>>>>>>>Normal
>>>>>>> operational adjustments (such as software upgrades, bug fixes,
>>>>>>>network
>>>>>>> renumbering and so on) are not to be restricted by this provision.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 9. Any dispute resolution among any of the Owner and the
>>>>>>>operational
>>>>>>> communities will follow the same overall dispute resolution
>>>>>>>mechanism
>>>>>>> as any other IANA IPR, with two overriding caveats:
>>>>>>> a. the continued operational stability of any registry hosted at
>>>>>>> iana.org is paramount;
>>>>>>> b. however, no IFO may continue to publish registries at iana.org
>>>>>>>or
>>>>>>> anywhere beneath it when the authoritative source for the registry
>>>>>>>data
>>>>>>> has instructed that such registries be removed.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> V.Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to IANA trademarks.
>>>>>>> 1. The trademarks must not become invalid, unenforceable, subject
>>>>>>>to
>>>>>>> cancellation or subject to claims of abandonment or ³genericide²
>>>>>>>as a
>>>>>>> result of the transfer of the trademarks or the Owner¹s actions or
>>>>>>> inactions.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2. As a result of the transition, there will be a license to ICANN
>>>>>>> (and either a license or sublicense to PTI) as the IANA functions
>>>>>>> operator(s) for the operational communities.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 6. Being a licensee of the trademarks does not convey a right to
>>>>>>> publish any particular IANA registry, independent of the relevant
>>>>>>> operational community¹s decision to make that licensee the
>>>>>>>operator of
>>>>>>> those registries. If a community is moved its registries from an
>>>>>>>IFO,
>>>>>>> the license to that entity should be transferred or terminated
>>>>>>> simultaneously with such move.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *c) Principles which would/may not be consistent with the CRISP IPR
>>>>>>> principles*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I. Principles and Requirements for the Post-Transition Owner of
>>>>>>>both
>>>>>>> the IANA Trademarks and Domain Names
>>>>>>> 1. The Owner must be ³neutral.²
>>>>>>> a. Structural neutrality: the Owner may not have any structural
>>>>>>>tie to
>>>>>>> any operational community to the exclusion of any other. (That is,
>>>>>>>if
>>>>>>> there is a structural tie to any operational community, there must
>>>>>>>be
>>>>>>> an equivalent tie to each of the other operational communities.
>>>>>>> Alternatively, the Owner could have no structural ties to any
>>>>>>> operational community.);
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note: I observe possible inconsistency with the CRISP IPR
>>>>>>>principles
>>>>>>> *if* 1.a. is set as the minimum requirement (See also "Note" under
>>>>>>>"a)
>>>>>>> Principles consistent with the CRISP IPR principles".)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *d) Details which are to be further discussed and to be coordinated
>>>>>>> (details relevant for framework/implementation)
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Details relevant for framework:
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I. Principles and Requirements for the Post-Transition Owner of
>>>>>>>both
>>>>>>> the IANA Trademarks and Domain Names
>>>>>>> (If put in the context of the numbers community)
>>>>>>> 3. The relationship of the names community to the Owner will be
>>>>>>> dictated by the type of ³neutrality² the names community requires.
>>>>>>>In
>>>>>>> the Trust context this means, as a practical matter :
>>>>>>> a. The names community would join the other operational
>>>>>>>communities in
>>>>>>> forming a Trust and each would appoint a Trustee (or Trustees) of
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> Trust and thereby have its interests directly represented in Trust
>>>>>>> decisions. Presumably, all three communities would also be named as
>>>>>>> beneficiaries of the Trust; OR
>>>>>>> b. The names community has a contractual relationship to the Trust,
>>>>>>> which could include an advisory board to provide advice to the
>>>>>>>Trust on
>>>>>>> matters relating to the IANA IPR.
>>>>>>> i. One such sample contractual relationship is described at
>>>>>>> 
>>>>>>>http://mm.icann.org/pipermail/cwg-stewardship/2015-October/004449.ht
>>>>>>>ml
>>>>>>> and the links from that message. It includes a contractual
>>>>>>>mechanism,
>>>>>>> with decisions informed by an advisory board.
>>>>>>> ii. In the case of the IETF Trust, the names community would not
>>>>>>> appoint any Trustees and would not be a beneficiary of the Trust.
>>>>>>> Instead, the IETF would continue to appoint all Trustees and the
>>>>>>>IETF
>>>>>>> would remain the sole beneficiary of the Trust.
>>>>>>> iii. Presumably, the numbers community would have a parallel
>>>>>>> relationship to the Trust. In the case of the IETF Trust, it is
>>>>>>>unclear
>>>>>>> how this would work for the protocols community, taking into
>>>>>>>account
>>>>>>> their existing relationship to the IETF Trust.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note: 3.b would sufficiently meet the needs of the number community
>>>>>>> proposal
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 5.The Owner must be responsive, responsible and accountable to the
>>>>>>> three communities.
>>>>>>> a. How responsive does the Owner need to be?
>>>>>>> b. How much influence should the three operational communities have
>>>>>>> over the actions of the Owner?
>>>>>>> c. How should the Owner be accountable to, and be held accountable
>>>>>>>by,
>>>>>>> the names community and the other operational communities?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 6. Owner must have necessary funding to carry out these
>>>>>>> responsibilities.
>>>>>>> Decision needed: Should the IPR be transferred to the Owner along
>>>>>>>with
>>>>>>> sufficient funding to cover some or all of the costs associated
>>>>>>>with
>>>>>>> ownership (quality control, policing & enforcement, maintenance of
>>>>>>> registrations), at least for a set period of time? Alternatively,
>>>>>>> should the operational communities provide ongoing funding to the
>>>>>>>Owner
>>>>>>> (in the form of pre-agreed payments or periodic royalty payments)?
>>>>>>>Or
>>>>>>> should the Owner be responsible for all such costs?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 8. Sidley cited several disadvantages (as well as some advantages)
>>>>>>>in
>>>>>>> connection with the use of a Trust generally, and the IETF Trust
>>>>>>> specifically, in its memo of August 4, 2015. The CWG should review
>>>>>>> these concerns and determine how Sidley¹s advice influences any
>>>>>>> decisions by the CWG to proceed. These concerns include:
>>>>>>> a. Trust must exert control over the quality of services
>>>>>>>distributed
>>>>>>> under the IANA IPR, either directly, or by designating a third
>>>>>>>party to
>>>>>>> do so on its behalf.
>>>>>>> b. The current beneficiary of the IETF Trust is the IETF itself;
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> community may want a broader multistakeholder organization or
>>>>>>> association, or ³the community² as the beneficiary.
>>>>>>> c. There would need to be safeguards against transfer of the IANA
>>>>>>>IPR
>>>>>>> by the IETF Trust, and specific instructions regarding disposition
>>>>>>>of
>>>>>>> the IANA IPR in the event of dissolution of the Trust.
>>>>>>> d. Trust will need to license the IPR to PTI.
>>>>>>> e. Agreements must be entered into reflecting the duties and
>>>>>>> responsibilities of the trustees with respect to the IANA IPR.
>>>>>>> f. Agreements should provide for the immediate transfer of title
>>>>>>>away
>>>>>>> from the trust, if the trustee breaches its duties with respect to
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> IANA IPR. These will be very important commitments from the trust
>>>>>>>to
>>>>>>> the multistakeholder community, and will need to be clear that the
>>>>>>> trustees will take direction from the community.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Note: The CRISP Team observes 3.b would sufficiently meet the
>>>>>>>needs of
>>>>>>> the community, without making 3.a a must.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> II.  Principles and requirements of the Owner in the event of
>>>>>>> separation
>>>>>>> 3. Clear guidelines must be in place so that Owner can comply with
>>>>>>> orders from operational communities in case of separation and
>>>>>>>required
>>>>>>> transfer of licenses (or termination and grant of new licenses).
>>>>>>> a. This could be operationalized through contract and bylaw
>>>>>>> requirements as well as the Trust document itself.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> III. Principles and requirements in the event that disputes arise
>>>>>>>with
>>>>>>> the Owner or between operational communities
>>>>>>> 1. a. A fairly straightforward procedure can be adopted to address
>>>>>>> these disputes, using the Stewardship and Accountability groups¹
>>>>>>> escalation procedures as inspiration.
>>>>>>> ii. This is not a UDRP/IRP type procedure.
>>>>>>> iii. Emphasis should be on discussion and resolution.
>>>>>>> iv. An Advisory Board composed of all three communities could be a
>>>>>>> significant part of any DRP.
>>>>>>> v. This can be implemented as part of the transfer of the IPR.
>>>>>>> Potentially, it could also be implemented later in the process.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> V.Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to IANA trademarks.
>>>>>>> 3. The Owner must be capable of carrying out the responsibilities
>>>>>>> expected of a trademark owner and licensor, including:
>>>>>>> k. Terminating the license and granting rights to a new IFO (if
>>>>>>> requested [or approved] by an operational community) is the
>>>>>>>ultimate
>>>>>>> form of quality control.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> V.Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to IANA trademarks.
>>>>>>> 4. Quality Control over Licensees
>>>>>>> a. A trademark owner has a legal obligation to exercise
>>>>>>> control/oversight over the marks and the business conducted under
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> marks, so this must be a guiding principle/requirement.
>>>>>>> b. However, this should not be the primary priority for the Owner.
>>>>>>> c. Primary focus should be to ensure that trademarks are being
>>>>>>>used in
>>>>>>> a manner consistent with the IANA Function.
>>>>>>> d. Quality control needs to be fit for purpose - needs to meet
>>>>>>>minimum
>>>>>>> requirements (legal requirements), but should not do more. Quality
>>>>>>> control has to meet the requirements / needs of all three
>>>>>>>communities.
>>>>>>> If any community has a concern about how IANA is performing in
>>>>>>>relation
>>>>>>> to trademark, a mechanism needs to be in place to address such
>>>>>>>concerns.
>>>>>>> f. Is it acceptable to the names community if quality control is
>>>>>>> delegated to the operational communities (according to each OC¹s
>>>>>>> responsibilities)?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Details relevant for Implementation:
>>>>>>> I. Principles and Requirements for the Post-Transition Owner of
>>>>>>>both
>>>>>>> the IANA Trademarks and Domain Names
>>>>>>> 8. Sidley cited several disadvantages (as well as some advantages)
>>>>>>>in
>>>>>>> connection with the use of a Trust generally, and the IETF Trust
>>>>>>> specifically, in its memo of August 4, 2015. The CWG should review
>>>>>>> these concerns and determine how Sidley¹s advice influences any
>>>>>>> decisions by the CWG to proceed. These concerns include:
>>>>>>> g. Consideration will need to be given as to the tax attributes of
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> trust.
>>>>>>> h. From the perspective of the USPTO, the IETF Trust is not a
>>>>>>>separate
>>>>>>> legal entity and the trustees of the IETF Trust collectively own
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> IANA IPR. USPTO records need to be updated as Trustees change.
>>>>>>> i. If non-US trademark registrations are required in foreign
>>>>>>> jurisdictions, the trust may not be recognized as a legal entity.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> IV.Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to iana.org
>>>>>>> 3. At the time of transition, the technical and operational
>>>>>>>control of
>>>>>>> the domain (in DNS registry terms, the technical contact) must
>>>>>>>remain
>>>>>>> with ICANN.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 4. The registrar to be used must provide controls such that the
>>>>>>> technical contact cannot be changed by the registrant without the
>>>>>>> technical contact being aware of that change.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 5. The registrar to be used must provide controls such that
>>>>>>>technical
>>>>>>> changes to the domain¹s delegation can be made by the technical
>>>>>>>contact
>>>>>>> without approval by, but with notice to, the registrant.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 6. ICANN may make any operational arrangements it likes in terms of
>>>>>>> the operation of the iana.org name. It is to be anticipated that,
>>>>>>>for
>>>>>>> practical purposes, ICANN will have its PTI affiliate perform the
>>>>>>> day-to-day operation of the domain.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 8. In the event of separation, it is not possible for multiple IANA
>>>>>>> functions operators to operate the same domain at the same time.
>>>>>>> Therefore, in order to arrange for the future possibility of
>>>>>>>multiple
>>>>>>> IANA functions operators, the transfer of iana.org to the new Owner
>>>>>>> must include a statement of understanding by ICANN that it will
>>>>>>> co-operate in creating separate (internal) delegations below
>>>>>>>iana.org
>>>>>>> to accommodate the different operational communities. (The
>>>>>>>creation of
>>>>>>> the separate delegations will not itself be part of the transfer of
>>>>>>> IANA.ORG to the new owner.) It is expected that the details of new
>>>>>>> arrangements shall be worked out among the operational communities
>>>>>>> within no longer than $period (suggestion: one year).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> V.Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to IANA trademarks.
>>>>>>> 3. The Owner must be capable of carrying out the responsibilities
>>>>>>> expected of a trademark owner and licensor, including:
>>>>>>> j. Quality Control over services offered by licensee(s) under IANA
>>>>>>> trademarks, with the understanding that the ability to terminate
>>>>>>>an IFO
>>>>>>> and license the mark and domain.
>>>>>>> l. Quality Control over how the IANA mark is used and displayed by
>>>>>>> licensee(s).
>>>>>>> m. Policing & enforcement of uses of the trademarks by unauthorized
>>>>>>> third parties.
>>>>>>> n. Maintenance of trademark registrations (and potentially filing
>>>>>>> additional trademark applications).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 2(2nd No.2). Ownership and management of the IANA trademarks is
>>>>>>> different than it would be for a normal commercial entity, in that
>>>>>>>the
>>>>>>> trademarks are being held by the Owner solely to be licensed
>>>>>>> exclusively to the IFO (or potentially, one or more IFO¹s) for the
>>>>>>> narrow functions of the affected operational communities. Beyond
>>>>>>>this,
>>>>>>> the Owner will not exploit the trademark in the traditional sense,
>>>>>>> i.e., the Owner will not itself provide services under the IANA
>>>>>>> trademarks, nor will it license the trademarks to third parties
>>>>>>>other
>>>>>>> than the IFO (or IFOs) (e.g., there should be no licenses for
>>>>>>>products
>>>>>>> (apparel, electronic goods, etc.) or other services).
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 4. Quality Control over Licensees
>>>>>>> e. Could quality control also be
>>>>>>>outsourced/delegated/subcontracted?
>>>>>>> i. Certain amount of operational control could be subcontracted,
>>>>>>>for
>>>>>>> example to operational communities, but ultimate
>>>>>>>control/responsibility
>>>>>>> is with the trademark owner.
>>>>>>> ii. Brand owner is required to exercise active quality control to
>>>>>>>meet
>>>>>>> minimum requirements.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> 5. Policing and Enforcement of Unauthorized Uses
>>>>>>> a. Owner should be able to set up and monitor a ³policing² process
>>>>>>>to
>>>>>>> look out for unauthorized third party uses of the trademarks (e.g.,
>>>>>>> watching services)
>>>>>>> b. Owner should have the capability to evaluate and, where
>>>>>>> appropriate, pursue and stop unauthorized uses through enforcement
>>>>>>>of
>>>>>>> the trademarks
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> *e) Intention to be confirmed by other party*
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> I. Principles and Requirements for the Post-Transition Owner of
>>>>>>>both
>>>>>>> the IANA Trademarks and Domain Names
>>>>>>> 4. The Owner must meet the requirements of the ICANN Board
>>>>>>>statement
>>>>>>> as set forth in its August 15, 2015 statement relating to
>>>>>>>neutrality:
>>>>>>> ³ICANN is prepared to transfer full ownership of the IANA-related
>>>>>>> trademarks to a neutral third party mutually agreed among the
>>>>>>> operational communities.²
>>>>>>> i. We don¹t know whether the Board would accept the operational
>>>>>>> communities¹ determination that a proposed new Owner is a ³neutral
>>>>>>> third party,² or would make its own determination.
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> V.Proposed Principles and Requirements Relating to IANA trademarks.
>>>>>>> 4. Quality Control over Licensees
>>>>>>> g. Question: Has ICANN had to exercise quality control over uses of
>>>>>>> the IANA in any kind of licensor/licensee relationship? If so, how
>>>>>>>has
>>>>>>> this been done?
>>>>>>> i. Question: How has IETF Trust exercised quality control with
>>>>>>> licensees?
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> -----
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> Izumi
>>>>>>>
>>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>>
>>>>>>
>>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>>
>>>>> _______________________________________________
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>>>>
>>>>
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