[CRISP-TEAM] Additional questions from the ICG on the numbers proposal

Sweeting, John john.sweeting at twcable.com
Fri Feb 27 16:21:29 CET 2015


I agree as well

On 2/27/15, 7:23 AM, "Nurani Nimpuno" <nurani at netnod.se> wrote:

>Fully agree with Alan's comments. As I read them, they are inline the
>suggested drafted text by Izumi.
>
>(Correct me if I'm wrong Alan.)
>
>Nurani
>
>On 27 feb 2015, at 12:59, Alan Barrett <apb at cequrux.com> wrote:
>
>> Here are some of my thoughts on the additional queastions.
>>
>>
>>> II.B.2. If the policy sources identified in Section II.A are affected,
>>>identify which ones are affected and explain in what way.
>>>
>>> Question1:
>>> What specifically is the ³element of oversight² which is referred to
>>>in this section, and how is it to be replaced under this proposal?
>>
>> The element of oversight that the NTIA provides for the IANA Numbering
>>Services is the ability to change the contract with ICANN.
>>
>> This is stated in the the very next paragraph of the CRISP proposal
>>(the last parwithgraph of section III.B.2), immediately after the
>>sentence that says "it would remove a significant element of oversight":
>>
>>  ICANN has historically provided IANA Numbering Services via
>>  the IANA Number Registries under the terms of the NTIA IANA
>>  Functions contract, and therefore IANA Numbering Services for
>>  the RIRs are currently subject to change in accordance with
>>  that agreement.
>>
>> Section II.B.3.i expands on this:
>>
>>  ICANN, as the current IANA Numbering Services Operator, is
>>  obligated by the NTIA agreement to manage the IANA Number
>>  Registries according to policies developed by the Internet
>>  Number Community.
>>
>>  Although the IANA operator escalation and reporting mechanisms
>>  are public in nature, the NTIA has an oversight role in the
>>  provision of the services through its contract with ICANN. The
>>  ultimate consequence of failing to meet the performance
>>  standards or reporting requirements is understood to be a
>>  decision by the contracting party (the NTIA) to terminate
>>  or not renew the IANA Functions Agreement with the current
>>  contractor (ICANN).
>>
>>> III.A. The elements of this proposal
>>> Question2:
>>> How will the Review Committee be established, how will it operate, and
>>>how is it related to any other ICANN-related review committees?
>>
>> 2a: How will the Review Committee be established?
>>
>> The Review Committee will be established by the RIRs, there will be
>>equal representation from each RIR region, and members will be selected
>>in an open, transparent, and bottom-up manner appropriate for each RIR
>>region.
>>
>> This is explained in section III.A.4 of the CRISP proposal:
>>
>>  The RIRs shall establish a Review Committee [...].
>>
>>  The Review Committee should be a team composed of suitably
>>  qualified Internet Number Community representatives from each
>>  RIR region. The selection of the Review Committee members
>>  should be conducted in an open, transparent, and bottom-up
>>  manner appropriate for each RIR region. There should be
>>  equal representation from each RIR region within the Review
>>  Committee.
>>
>> 2b: How will the Review Committee operate?
>>
>> The Review Committee will review the level of service provided by the
>> IANA Numbering Services Operator (which will initially be ICANN), and
>> will report any concerns to the NRO EC.  The Review Committee will not
>> do anything else.  The Review Committee's activities will be conducted
>> in an open and transparent manner.
>>
>> This is explained in section III.A.4 of the CRISP proposal:
>>
>>  The RIRs shall establish a Review Committee that will advise
>>  and assist the NRO EC in its periodic review. The Review
>>  Committee will, as needed, undertake a review of the level of
>>  service received from the IANA Numbering Services Operator and
>>  report to the NRO EC any concerns regarding the performance
>>  of the IANA Numbering Services Operator, including especially
>>  any observed failure or near-failure by the IANA Numbering
>>  Services Operator to meet its obligations under the proposed
>>  agreement. Any such Review Committee will advise the NRO EC
>>  in its capacity solely to oversee the performance of the
>>  IANA Numbering Services, and the Review Committee's advice
>>  and comment will be limited to the processes followed in the
>>  IANA Numbering Services Operator's performance under the
>>  proposed agreement. Activities of the Review Committee shall be
>>  conducted in an open and transparent manner. Reports from the
>>  Review Committee shall be published.
>>
>> 2c: How is the Review Committee related to ny other ICANN-related
>> review committees?
>>
>> It is not related to any other committees.
>>
>>> Question3:
>>> Given the stated need for ³communication and coordination² between the
>>>communities, how is this to be achieved under this proposal?
>>
>> This question seeme to refer to the last paragraph of section III.A of
>>the CRISP proposal:
>>
>>  This proposal assumes that specific IANA customers (i.e., the
>>  number community, the protocol parameter community, and the
>>  name community) will have independent arrangements with
>>  the IANA Functions Operator related to maintenance of the
>>  specific registries for which they are responsible. At the
>>  same time, the Internet Number Community wishes to emphasize
>>  the importance of communication and coordination between these
>>  communities to ensure the stability of the IANA services. Such
>>  communication and coordination would be especially vital
>>  should the three communities reach different decisions
>>  regarding the identity of the IANA Functions Operator after
>>  the transition. Efforts to facilitate this communication and
>>  coordination should be undertaken by the affected communities
>>  via processes distinct from this stewardship transition
>>  process.
>>
>> In the event that all three communities (numbers, protocol parameters,
>>and names) choose the same IANA operator, then we expect that minimal
>>coordination will be required.  In the event that different IANA
>>operators are chosen by different communities, then significant
>>coordination may be required to ensure stability.
>>
>> The CRISP proposal does not specify how such coordination might take
>>place, it merely records that coordination may be necessary.
>>
>> --apb (Alan Barrett)
>>
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>
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