[CRISP-TEAM] [Feedback before UTC4:30am 12/26] Re: Common Understanding & Clarifications
Izumi Okutani
izumi at nic.ad.jp
Wed Dec 24 05:30:21 CET 2014
CRISP Team,
It is very important we share a common understanding to explain to
our communities. This is a summary of rationale behind our proposal.
Please comment before: UTC3:00am 26th Dec
If you have a different understanding from what is described
below/anything else you wish to add.
As requested by Mwendwa at the 5th call, this can be circulated to your
respective communities, if considered useful (but upto each CRISP Team
members whether to share).
This has been circulated on the CRISP Team mailing list last week
and I updated the part about global PDP as described below.
How changes are reflected & described:
--------------------------------------
* Deleted the part which described rationale behind remove of ICANN
Board approval from global PDP.
- At the 3rd call it was agreed to propose to "remove ICANN Board's
approval from global PDP".
- However at the 4th call, it was suggested to address this issue in
SLA clause, instead of proposing removal of ICANN Board approval
from globa PDP.
* I have *not* explicitly described that compliance to ASO MoU to be
included in SLA as one of the conditions to terminate the agreement.
- Seems too detailed at this stage
- You can explain about inclusion of compliance with ASO MoU as
termination clause, as an approach we are suggesting when
developing SLA, if asked by the community.
Thanks,
Izumi
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Common Understanding & Clarifications
(Can be shared with your communities if you consider this useful)
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summary of the current situation
What will be affected by NTIA's announcement
- NTIA will transfer stewardship on the IANA functions as defined in
the IANA contract
- AoC, between ICANN and the US goverment remains (not transfered)
Current RIR legal arrangements with ICANN
- Global Policies: ASO MoU
Dispute resolution mechanism by the thirty party is defined in the
MoU, in case ICANN board is not accountable
- IANA function services provided to RIRs
No official legal document today: stewardship was considered to be
maintained based on IANA contract by the US government
Proposed elements
a. ICANN continues to be the operator of IANA
b. Exchange SLA with ICANN on IANA number resources function
c. Review Committee (Name to be decided)
- NRO EC will conduct the review whether ICANN performs the IANA
functios on numbers according to SLA
- Review Commitee will provide advice to NRO EC as community
representives to increase credibility of NRO EC's review, that it
has taken in inputs from its communities
- Members of the review committee will be selected from each RIR
region, with simliar concept/scheme as CRISP Team
(It is not creating a new entity)
Rationale for proposed elements
a. ICANN continues to be the operator of IANA
- RIRs are satisfied with the current services by ICANN
- Continuing with the current operator(i.e, ICANN) is desirable, if
we are satisfied, for stability of the function
b. Exchange SLA with ICANN on IANA number resources function
- To clarify relationships that that RIRs are delegating operation
of the IANA functions on number resources to ICANN
(also consistent rationale with IETF's proposal)
- Ensure our expected service level is maintained
- Allows RIRs to terminate the contract with the IANA function
service operator (i.e., ICANN) if ICANN doesn't sufficiently
address needs of RIRs and its communities
c. Review Committee
- Gives credibilities to the review of SLA to be conducted by the
NRO EC, on the number resources related IANA function services
Other consideration we made
d. Global Policy Development process
- I was agreed, it is important to seperate IANA function on number
resources and global Policy Development Process (gPDP).
- We should focus our proposal on IANA function on number
resources, as this is what is affected by NTIA stewardship
transition. NTIA plays no role/involvement in gPDP.
Rationale for not adopting some elements proposed on some RIR region(s)
e. Reasons for not supporting AoC
- The CRISP Team should focus to consider what would be missing as a
result of the NTIA IANA stewardship transition
- The US goverment keeps the AoC, so there is no need to replace this
part
- The part that will be missing is the contract related to the IANA
functions, which will be covered by SLA between ICANN and RIRs
- SLA is sufficient in ensuring to receive the IANA services and
accountabilities related this function
- Do not see why RIRs must be accountable to ICANN and define in AoC
RIRs should be accountantable to its communities, not ICANN
f. Reasons for change from MONC to Review Committee
- Some of the RIRs believe that MONC is complex and overly
burdensome, to oversee the performance of a contract where, over
the past 12 months, the IANA functions operator has performed only
eight transactions for the RIRs
- Have the scheme based on the existing framework, rather than
creating a new entity
------------------------------------------------------------------------
(2014/12/19 0:09), Izumi Okutani wrote:
> Dear Andres,
>
>
> Thank you for your feedback and I'm happy to know you agree with the
> descriptions, including the part about the Review Committee.
>
>
>
> All CRISP Team members,
>
> I would appreciate your feeback, especially if you have different
> understanding from what's described here.
>
> (Priority should go to checking the announcement and the latest draft
> proposal to be sent from Michael - this can be wait to be reviewed after
> we make the announcement)
>
> I updated one point from the version, to reflect the removal of global
> PDP from our proposal.
>
>
> Izumi
>
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
> Summary of the current situation
> What will be affected by NTIA's announcement
> - NTIA will transfer stewardship on the IANA functions as defined in
> the IANA contract
> - AoC, between ICANN and the US goverment remains (not transfered)
>
> Current RIR legal arrangements with ICANN
> - Global Policies: ASO MoU
> Dispute resolution mechanism by the thirty party is defined in the
> MoU, in case ICANN board is not accountable
> - IANA function services provided to RIRs
> No official legal document today: stewardship was considered to be
> maintained based on IANA contract by the US government
>
> Proposed elements
> a. ICANN continues to be the operator of IANA
> b. Exchange SLA with ICANN on IANA number resources function
> c. Review Committee (Name to be decided)
> - NRO EC will conduct the review whether ICANN performs the IANA
> functios on numbers according to SLA
> - Review Commitee will provide advice to NRO EC as community
> representives to increase credibility of NRO EC's review, that it
> has taken in inputs from its communities
> - Members of the review committee will be selected from each RIR
> region, with simliar concept/scheme as CRISP Team
> - Review
> ## Needs confirmation from LACNIC region if this is correct ##
>
> Rationale for proposed elements
> a. ICANN continues to be the operator of IANA
> - RIRs are satisfied with the current services by ICANN
> - Continuing with the current operator is desirable, if we are
> satisfied, for stability of the function
>
> b. Exchange SLA with ICANN on IANA number resources function
> - To clarify relationships that that RIRs are delegating operation
> of the IANA functions on number resources to ICANN
> (also consistent rationale with IETF's proposal)
> - Ensure our expected service level is maintained
>
> c. Review Committee
> - Gives credibilities to the review of SLA to be conducted by the
> NRO EC, on the number resources related IANA function services
>
> Other consideration we made
> d. Remove ICANN Board's approval on Global Policies
> - This was suggested and discussed at the 3rd call but agreed to
> remove this proposal at the 4th call
> - We shouldn't mix global PDP with IANA operations as they are
> seperate issues and it is not a part of the NTIA stewardship
> transition. Hence out of scope of our work.
> - It was also considered not appropriate for CRISP team to propose
> about ASO MoU, without going throught the standard, bottom up
> process. This will make it top-down, against our principles.
>
> Rationale for not adopting some elements proposed on some RIR region(s)
> e. Reasons for not supporting AoC
> - The CRISP Team should focus to consider what would be missing as a
> result of the NTIA IANA stewardship transition
> - The US goverment keeps the AoC, so there is no need to replace this
> part
> - The part that will be missing is the contract related to the IANA
> functions, which will be covered by SLA between ICANN and RIRs
> - SLA is sufficient in ensuring to receive the IANA services
> - Do not see why RIRs must be accountable to ICANN and define in AoC
> RIRs should be accountantable to its communities, not ICANN
>
> On the other hand:
> - No objections were observed that there may be issues related to
> ICANN Board's decisions on Global policies
> (This is inteded to be addressed by c.Remove ICANN Board's approval
> on Global Policies )
>
> f. Reasons for change from MONC to Review Committee
> - Some of the RIRs believe that MONC is complex and overly
> burdensome, to oversee the performance of a contract where, over
> the past 12 months, the IANA functions operator has performed only
> eight transactions for the RIRs
> - Have the scheme based on the existing framework
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>
> (2014/12/18 22:14), Andres Piazza wrote:
>> Dear Izumi,
>>
>> I believe this common understanding is very useful. I can agree with
>> this.
>>
>> The same applies your clarifications of the Review Committee.
>>
>> Andres
>>
>> El 12/18/14 5:57 AM, Izumi Okutani escribi���:
>>> CRISP Team,
>>>
>>>
>>> As you will be explaining rationale behind CRISP Team proposal
>>> within your regional communities, it probably helps to have a common
>>> understanding among CRISP team.
>>>
>>> This is the rationale I summarised based on observations of discussions
>>> by the team. It is not intended to share this publicly, to just as a
>>> reference for a common understanding among us.
>>>
>>>
>>> * Please let me know if there is anything which is different
>>> from your undestanding, or wish to further clarify.
>>>
>>> * Please raise questions if there is anything you are not clear about
>>> any proposal elements
>>>
>>> For the purpose of preparing the proposal for tomorrow, there is no need
>>> to clarify all questions at this stage, as long as people find it
>>> acceptable about what is being proposed.
>>>
>>>
>>> Izumi
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>> Summary of the current situation
>>> What will be affected by NTIA's announcement
>>> - NTIA will transfer stewardship on the IANA functions as defined in
>>> the IANA contract
>>> - AoC, between ICANN and the US goverment remains (not transfered)
>>>
>>> Current RIR legal arrangements with ICANN
>>> - Global Policies: ASO MoU
>>> Dispute resolution mechanism by the thirty party is defined in the
>>> MoU, in case ICANN board is not accountable
>>> - IANA function services provided to RIRs
>>> No official legal document today: stewardship was considered to be
>>> maintained based on IANA contract by the US government
>>>
>>> Proposed elements
>>> a. ICANN continues to be the operator of IANA
>>> b. Exchange SLA with ICANN on IANA number resources function
>>> c. Remove ICANN Board's approval on Global Policies
>>> d. Review Committee (Name to be decided)
>>> - NRO EC will conduct the review whether ICANN performs the IANA
>>> functios on numbers according to SLA
>>> - Review Commitee will provide advice to NRO EC as community
>>> representives to increase credibility of NRO EC's review, that it
>>> has taken in inputs from its communities
>>> - Members of the review committee will be selected from each RIR
>>> region, with simliar concept/scheme as CRISP Team
>>> - Review
>>> ## Needs confirmation from LACNIC region if this is correct ##
>>>
>>> Rationale for proposed elements
>>> a. ICANN continues to be the operator of IANA
>>> - RIRs are satisfied with the current services by ICANN
>>> - Continuing with the current operator is desirable, if we are
>>> satisfied, for stability of the function
>>>
>>> b. Exchange SLA with ICANN on IANA number resources function
>>> - To clarify relationships that that RIRs are delegating operation
>>> of the IANA functions on number resources to ICANN
>>> (also consistent rationale with IETF's proposal)
>>> - Ensure our expected service level is maintained
>>>
>>> c. Remove ICANN Board's approval on Global Policies
>>> - Here, we need to be able to explain what part about Global
>>> Policies approval would be affected
>>> (NTIA doesn't play a role in the process)
>>> - Why we think the approach of removing ICANN Board's approval is
>>> the best, compared to other solutions such as reviewing and
>>> strengthening the exising ASO MoU and/or SLA to be developed.
>>>
>>> d. Review Committee
>>> - Gives credibilities to the review of SLA to be conducted by the
>>> NRO EC, on the number resources related IANA function services
>>>
>>> Rationale for not adopting some elements proposed on some RIR region(s)
>>> e. Reasons for not supporting AoC
>>> - The CRISP Team should focus to consider what would be missing as a
>>> result of the NTIA IANA stewardship transition
>>> - The US goverment keeps the AoC, so there is no need to replace this
>>> part
>>> - The part that will be missing is the contract related to the IANA
>>> functions, which will be covered by SLA between ICANN and RIRs
>>> - SLA is sufficient in ensuring to receive the IANA services
>>> - Do not see why RIRs must be accountable to ICANN and define in AoC
>>> RIRs should be accountantable to its communities, not ICANN
>>>
>>> On the other hand:
>>> - No objections were observed that there may be issues related to
>>> ICANN Board's decisions on Global policies
>>> (This is inteded to be addressed by c.Remove ICANN Board's approval
>>> on Global Policies )
>>>
>>> f. Reasons for change from MONC to Review Committee
>>> - Some of the RIRs believe that MONC is complex and overly
>>> burdensome, to oversee the performance of a contract where, over
>>> the past 12 months, the IANA functions operator has performed only
>>> eight transactions for the RIRs
>>> - Have the scheme based on the existing framework
>>>
>>> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>>>
>>> _______________________________________________
>>> CRISP mailing list
>>> CRISP at nro.net
>>> https://www.nro.net/mailman/listinfo/crisp
>>
>>
>> _______________________________________________
>> CRISP mailing list
>> CRISP at nro.net
>> https://www.nro.net/mailman/listinfo/crisp
>
>
> _______________________________________________
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